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DRONES AND TRANSNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICTS 
Michael W. Lewis
*
 
 
Drones are certainly one of the most discussed features 
of the ongoing conflict between the United States and al Qaeda, 
and in many ways they are one of the most misunderstood.   To 
some they represent a step towards a dystopian future in which 
Terminator-like machines relentlessly hunt down human 
beings.
1
  Others have criticized drones for causing civilian 
casualties,
2
 for violating the sovereignty of nations not directly 
involved in the conflict,
3
 for increasing the support for al 
Qaeda amongst the civilian population,
4
 and for bringing a 
“video-game” mentality to warfare.5  Drone strikes are viewed 
                                                 
*
 Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law.  I would 
like to thank the members of the St. John’s Journal of International and Comparative 
Law for creating an excellent Symposium to discuss the legality and policy 
considerations underlying the use of armed drones.  I would also like to thank the 
participants at the symposium for their comments and suggestions concerning this 
essay.  In discussing the capabilities, limitations and near term uses of drones I draw 
upon my experience flying F-14’s for the U.S. Navy during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
1
 See Peter Finn, A Future for Drones: Automated Killing, WASHINGTON POST 
(Sep. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/a-future-
for-drones-automated-
killing/2011/09/15/gIQAVy9mgK_story.html?wpisrc=emailtoafriend; see also David 
Luban, What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones and Just War Theory, 
BOSTON REVIEW (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.3/david_luban_obama_drones_just_war_theory.ph
p. 
2
 See US Drone Strikes ‘Raise Questions’ – UN’s Navi Pillay, BBC NEWS ASIA 
(June 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18363003. 
3
 Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight 
and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (Apr. 28, 2010) (statement of Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
Professor, University of Notre Dame)[hereinafter O’Connell testimony]; see also LA 
Times Editorial Board, A Closer Look at Drones, LA TIMES (Sep. 25, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/25/opinion/la-ed-drones-20110925. 
4
 See Sudarsan Raghavan, In Yemen, US Airstrikes Breed Anger, and Sympathy 
for al Qaeda, WASHINGTON POST (May 29, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-
anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html. 
5
 See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions, ¶84, UN Doc. HRC/14/24/Add. 6, (May 28, 2010), 
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negatively by the general populations of most nations surveyed 
in a recent poll by Pew Research,
6
 and some jurists have gone 
so far as to suggest that their use should be banned entirely, 
comparing them to cluster munitions and landmines.
7
  Yet in 
spite of all these supposed faults drones have been used with 
increasing frequency in the conflict with al Qaeda as well as in 
other low-intensity conflicts in Libya and Somalia.
8
  Most of 
these critics attribute this use to the political advantage 
associated with a “no risk” war fought by invulnerable drone 
operators who sit thousands of miles  from the battlefield.
9
  This 
invulnerability creates a sense that such a conflict in which one 
side does not risk its soldiers is “unfair ,” contributing to the 
widespread negative perception of drones.  Given all of these 
negatives, why is drone use becoming more, rather than less 
prevalent? 
 
Why Are Drones Used?   
 
Ironically the extensive use of drones has a great deal to 
do with a different form of perceived “unfairness”, that posed 
by asymmetric warfare to many of the world’s militaries during 
the past few decades.  Asymmetric warfare  is not new.  
Conflicts involving two parties between which there is a large 
disparity in the quantity and/or quality of military manpower 
                                                                                                                      
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pd
f. 
6
 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International 
Policies Faulted: Drone Strikes Widely Opposed, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 13, 
2012), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-
slips-international-policies-faulted/ [hereinafter Pew Survey]. 
7
 Murray Wardrop, Unmanned Drones Could be Banned, Says Senior Judge, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 6, 2009),, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5755446/Unmanned-drones-could-
be-banned-says-senior-judge.html (quoting Lord Bingham, a retired senior law lord). 
8
 See Michael Georgy, U.S. Sends Drones to Libya, Battle Rages for Misrata, 
REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-libya-
idUSTRE7270JP20110421; see also Alex Spilius, Britain ‘Flew Drones Over Libya’, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Jul. 26, 2012). 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/9430380/Brit
ain-flew-drones-over-Libya.html (indicating that the RAF used American-made 
Predator drones over Libya). 
9
 See Notes 1–7 supra. 
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and equipment have existed for centuries or even millennia.  In 
most cases the weaker irregular forces were either resisting an 
army of occupation (e.g. the partisans that fought the Germans 
in Yugoslavia during World War II or the Arab uprising against 
the Turks lead by the British officer T.E. Lawrence during 
World War I) or were internal insurgencies against the 
government (e.g. the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka or the FARC in Colombia).  During the 
past half century these asymmetric wars have resulted in one of 
four outcomes; 1) military victory for the irregular forces after 
the collapse of the government or the withdraw of government 
troops from the contested region;
10
 2) military defeat for the 
irregular forces;
11
 3) political accommodation between the two 
sides;
12
 or 4) continuing conflict.
13
   
 
The nature of transnational armed conflict , that is a 
conflict between a state and an external non-state actor such as 
the US versus al-Qaeda, makes many of these outcomes 
virtually impossible.
14
  Unless it redefines its goals, al Qaeda 
cannot achieve a military victory because its current goals go 
beyond merely expelling US forces from Iraq, Afghanistan or 
Yemen and it has no way of threatening to topple the US 
government.  Similarly without changes in al Qaeda’s goals, 
political accommodation is seemingly impossible because any 
form of agreement between local al Qaeda organizations and 
their “host” state will not end the conflict with the US.  On the 
other hand, the nature of al Qaeda and the larger context of the 
                                                 
10
 E.g. The Vietcong and North Vietnam were victorious when the South 
Vietnamese government fell; Mao’s Communist Chinese rebellion succeeded when it 
pushed Chiang Kai-Shek’s government off the mainland to Taiwan; the Chechens were 
victorious in the First Chechen War when Russia withdrew its troops from the region. 
11
 E.g. The Tamil Tigers were crushed by the Sri Lankan military in 2009; Russia 
reasserted its military control over Chechnya after the Second Chechen War. 
12
 The IRA agreed to decommission its military arm and peacefully participate in 
the political process. 
13
 The continuing conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC has 
gone on for over 45 years. 
14
 See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict:  A 
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 
ISR. L. REV. 46, 50 (2009) (setting out the need for the law of armed conflict to evolve 
to address the “emerging category” of “transnational armed conflict”). 
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conflict between Islamic states and Israel means that any US 
military victory depends heavily on the ability to disrupt and 
destroy the capabilities of al Qaeda and its offshoots without 
alienating the broader populations of nations where al Qaeda is 
found.     
 
Although asymmetric warfare is not new, the role that 
law has played in asymmetric conflicts of the past thirty years 
is.  Human rights organizations and the UN now routinely 
address the legality of actions undertaken by parties t o such 
conflicts.  These legal assessments can be as informal as a 
single press release
15
 or as formal as the reports of United 
Nations official fact-finding missions from conflicts like the 
ones in Gaza and Sri Lanka.
16
  In addition two publications by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Customary International Humanitarian Law,
17
 and Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law have directly addressed 
some of the more difficult legal questions associated with 
asymmetric warfare.
18
  As a result, the conduct of all armed 
                                                 
15
 See e.g. Clive Baldwin, Syria is Bound by the Laws of War, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/09/syria-bound-laws-war; 
see also Stephanie Nebehay, Red Cross Ruling Raises Question of Syrian War Crimes, 
REUTERS (July 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/14/us-syria-crisis-
icrc-idUSBRE86D09H20120714. 
16
 See e.g. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and 
Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Gaza Conflict, Sep. 25, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48; GAOR 12
th
 Sess., 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf 
[hereinafter Goldstone Report]; see also Rep.of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, March 31, 2001, 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf [hereinafter Sri 
Lanka Report]. 
17
 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME 1: RULES 355 
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds. 2005) [hereinafter Customary 
IHL]. 
18
 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 997 
(2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf, 
[hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (while neither the Interpretive Guidance nor 
Customary International Humanitarian Law have the force of law because they cannot 
become customary international law without opinio juris to support them, they both 
strive to provide definitive answers to the questions of who may be targeted and when.  
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conflicts, including asymmetric ones, is subjected to a great 
deal more legal scrutiny than it was thirty years ago, 
particularly with regard to limiting or avoiding civilian 
casualties.  The way that these legal assessments deal with the 
thorniest questions raised by asymmetric warfare has been a 
factor in the increasing reliance on armed drones.     
 
Both sides in an asymmetric armed conflict have legal 
responsibilities for avoiding harm to civilians.
19
  On the one 
hand, irregular armed groups are required to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population
20
 and are prohibited 
from using the civilian population to shield them from attack.
21
  
On the other hand, state militaries are prohibited from 
conducting attacks that are expected to cause disproportionate 
damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure in light of the 
military advantage gained.
22
  They are also required to take all 
feasible precautions to prevent or minimize civilian casualties 
and to provide warnings to the civilian population of imminent 
attacks.
23
   
 
In practice, however, these have not been interpreted to 
be reciprocal obligations.  Determinations of whether irregular 
armed groups improperly intermingled themselves with the 
civilian population have turned not on their proximity to the 
civilian population when they initiated offensive operations, 
but rather on whether the armed groups subjectively “intended” 
for the civilian population to act as a shield.
24
  Absent evidence 
that the fighters forced civilians to remain in proximity to the 
                                                                                                                      
The Interpretive Guidance also attempts to define the circumstances in which a civilian 
forfeits their immunity from attack). 
19
 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
Art. 48, 51-58, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (although 
Protocol I is technically applicable to only international armed conflicts, many of these 
provisions concerning the protection of the civilian population are widely viewed as 
customary law in non-international armed conflicts as well). 
20
 Id. Art. 48. 
21
 Id. Art. 51(7). 
22
 Id. Art. 51(5b). 
23
 Id. Art. 57. 
24
 See Goldstone Report 123; see also Sri Lanka Report 65. 
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fighting, no violation was found.
25
  Although the ICRC is clear 
that the use of civilians as human shields is illegal,
26
 its 
analysis of human shielding situations  insists that the “use of 
civilians as human shields does not release the attacker from 
his obligations with respect to the civilian population.” 27  In 
other words the use of human shields by irregular armed groups 
may be illegal, but it is also effective.  Any attack on a 
shielded target would be considered a violation of the laws of 
war by an attacker if the attacker was aware of the shielding 
and it produced disproportionate civilian casualties.  Likewise 
any attack that is not preceded an effective warning could also 
be considered a violation if it resulted in civilian casualties that 
could have been avoided if a more effective warning had been 
given.
28
  While it is unclear whether these interpretations of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL, the term used to describe 
Geneva Convention law) are effective in reducing civilians 
during an asymmetric armed conflict,
29
 it is clear that honoring 
                                                 
25
 Id. 
26
 See Customary IHL Rule 97; see also Interpretive Guidance 56-58 and Sri 
Lanka Report 65. 
27
 Interpretive Guidance 57 fn. 142; see also Sri Lanka Report 65. 
28
 See Goldstone Report 130-33. 
29
 The legal concept that an attacker violates IHL if it causes civilian casualties 
when attacking irregular armed forces that are intermingled with the civilian population 
has the same intuitive appeal as the tort law doctrine of “last clear chance”.  Both are 
based upon the idea that a party that is capable of avoiding causing harm (be they 
tortfeasor or attacker) should be legally required to do so.  While the “last clear chance 
doctrine” may have been appropriate for torts (although it has largely been supplanted 
by comparative fault in most US jurisdictions) its application to IHL is much more 
problematic because the victims (civilians) and wrongdoers (irregular armed groups) 
are separate entities whereas in tort law they are one and the same person.  Last clear 
chance allowed a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover when a tortfeasor had a 
final chance to avoid causing harm even though the victim contributed to the 
occurrence which harmed him.  Because it is unlikely that the victim benefited from 
being harmed, allowing for compensation when the tortfeasor could have avoided 
causing the harm seems appropriate.  In IHL irregular armed groups are contributing to 
the likelihood that civilians will be harmed by conducting operations in close proximity 
to the civilian population.  Because the irregular armed groups stand to benefit from 
civilian casualties caused by strikes conducted by the state armed forces they oppose, it 
is less clear that this interpretation of IHL is an effective or appropriate way to reduce 
civilian casualties.  Whether this interpretation of IHL can be viewed as incentivizing 
(although not directly endorsing) the practice of irregular armed groups conducting 
operations in close proximity to the civilian population, the appropriateness of this 
interpretation from either a legal or policy standpoint is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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these interpretations will alter the behavior of state armed 
forces. 
 
Because observing these restrictions when fighting an 
enemy that conducts its operations in close proximity to the 
civilian population effectively negates much of the firepower 
advantage enjoyed by state armed forces , regular militaries 
involved in asymmetric conflicts have reacted to the 
restrictions in one of two ways.  In several instances they have 
virtually ignored the restrictions entirely employing artillery, 
rocket launchers and bombers in assaults on irregular forces in 
densely populated areas resulting in tens of thousands of 
civilian casualties.
30
  Alternatively, forces that attempted to 
comply with these restrictions turned to their technological 
advantage to find a solution to the problem posed by 
asymmetric warfare and the laws that govern it.   
 
If human shielding is deemed to be legally effective then 
attacks had to become more discriminating, intelligence had to 
be more accurate and the weapons employed had to become 
much smaller than the ones designed to defeat a more 
traditional military opponent.
31
  It was in the gathering of real-
                                                 
30
 See Sri Lanka Report supra note 6, at 55-60, (the Sri Lankan military used a 
great deal of heavy artillery in its final offensive against the Tamil Tigers in 2009 and 
killed tens of thousands of civilians in doing so). See John Sweeney, Revealed: 
Russia’s Worst War Crime in Chechnya, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2000), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/mar/05/russia.chechnya;  see also Russian 
Tanks Pounding Grozny from 3 Directions, NY TIMES (Dec. 18, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/18/world/russian-tanks-pounding-grozny-from-3-
directions.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/I/Immigration%20and%2
0Refugees (the Russian military used tanks, artillery and bombers extensively in their 
assaults on the Chechen capital of Grozny during both the First (1994-95) and Second 
(1999-2000) Chechen Wars resulting in tens of thousands of civilian casualties). 
31
 Compare. MK-82 General Purpose Bomb Specifications, GLOBAL 
SECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk82-
specs.htm (stating that the Mark-82 bomb (the smallest of the munitions typically 
employed by manned aircraft) with a total weight of ~500 lbs and a warhead weight of 
192 lbs), with AGM-114 Hellfire Specifications, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm-114-specs.htm (noting 
that the Hellfire missile that is the most frequently used drone launched munition with 
a total weight of approximately 100 lbs and a warhead weight of ~35 pounds), and 
AGM-114 Hellfire Specifications, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm (stating that the 
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time intelligence that drones first made an appearance in the 
conflict with al Qaeda.  Their exceptional endurance of 
between 20 and 30 hours allowed for long loiter times over the 
target which helped to accurately identify individual targets as 
well as establishing their patterns of movement.
32
  With the 
exception of one strike in late 2002,
33
 drones were used almost 
exclusively in this role through the mid-2000’s.  Over the four 
years from the beginning of 2004 to the end of  2007 armed 
drones only conducted 9 strikes in Pakistan.
34
      
 
Weapons also got smaller and more precise.  The 
standard laser guided bomb employed in the 1990’s and early 
2000’s was the GBU-24, a 2,000 pound bomb with a 945 pound 
warhead.  In large part out of concern for reducing collateral 
damage the mid-2000’s saw the introduction of a much smaller 
smart bomb, the GBU-39 weighing only 250 lbs. with a 
warhead of 50 lbs.
35
 
 
  However, continuing criticisms of civilian casualties 
caused by conventional airstrikes
36
 and night raids by Special 
Forces
37
 in both Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to put 
                                                                                                                      
most common laser guided bomb dropped by manned aircraft is the 2,000 lb Paveway 
with a 945 lb warhead, although the smaller GBU-39 was introduced in ~2006 with a 
total weight of 250 lbs with a 50 lb warhead). 
32
 See Predator B UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC., 
http://www.ga-asi.com/ products/aircraft/predator_b.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012); 
see also Predator C Avenger UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS INC., 
http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_c.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
33
 See Drone Warfare: Are Strikes by Unmanned Aircraft Ethical?,CQ 
RESEARCHER, Aug. 6, 2010 at 663, available at 
http://www.asil.org/files/CQ_DroneWarfare.pdf. 
34
 Id. at 656. 
35
 See Id. 
36
 See generally Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in 
Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0908web_0.pdf. 
37
 See Civil Liberties and National Security: Before the Subcommittee On The 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary House 
of Representatives, 111
th
 Cong. 77–78 (2010) (Prepared Testimony of Jeremy Scahill, 
Correspondent, The Nation),; see also Alissa Rubin, US Transfers Control of Night 
Raids to Afghanistan, NY TIMES, Apr. 8, 2012,at A1 (claiming that night raids were 
also politically unpopular in Afghanistan because they violated the privacy of women 
and children).. 
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pressure on the United States to seek alternatives.   Armed 
drones offered the advantage of smaller weapons (Hellfire 
missiles designed for use on helicopters)  that weigh 100 lbs. 
with a warhead of approximately 35 lbs. and real -time control 
over firing decisions that special forces and conventional 
aircraft could not offer.  Although drones were also initially 
criticized for causing civilian casualties
38
 there was evidence 
from the beginning that these were often based upon 
exaggerated reports generated by the Taliban for political 
purposes.
39
  As time has gone on more careful studies on the 
question of civilian casualties from drone strikes have been 
conducted.  These more objective assessments, along with 
refinements in drone targeting such as targeting vehicles 
instead of compounds to reduce the likelihood that family 
members would be harmed, have made it widely accepted that 
civilian casualties from drone strikes are very low.
40
  So low in 
fact, that there are serious questions now about whether drones 
should be required to be used in many circumstances.
41
   
 
Like the early claims about civilian casualties, the 
commonly heard criticism that armed drones bring a video 
game mentality to warfare that makes drone operators less 
likely to obey the laws of war or to understand the 
                                                 
38
 See notes 1–7 supra. 
39
 See Kenneth Anderson, Am I Arguing a Strawman About Drones and Civilian 
Casualties?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 27, 2011, 9:51 AM),, 
http://volokh.com/2011/04/27/am-i-arguing-a-strawman-about-drones-and-civilian-
casualties (arguing that the recent acknowledgement by many human rights advocates 
of the superior target discrimination of drones does not alter the fact that many of the 
early criticisms of drones were related to excessive civilian casualties; see also C. 
Christine Fair, Drones Over Pakistan—Menace or Best Viable Option?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-over-
pakistan----m_b_666721.html (arguing that reports by U.S. and Pakistani media 
exaggerate civilian casualties caused by drones). See Farhat Taj, Drone Attacks:  
Challenging Some Fabrications, DAILY TIMES (Jan. 2, 2010), 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C01%5C02%5Cstory_2-1-
2010_pg3_5 (indicating that the U.S. and Pakistani media do not accurately report 
civilian casualties caused by drone strikes). 
40
 Peter Bergen, Civilian Casualties Plummet in Drone Strikes, CNN.COM (July 
14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/opinion/bergen-civilian-
casualties/index.html. 
41
 Scott Shane, The Moral Case for Drones, NY TIMES, July 14, 2012,, at SR4.. 
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consequences of their actions has not stood up to serious 
examination.  The fact that drone operators are at risk for 
PTSD and that in some cases they display greater levels of 
combat stress than some units in Afghanistan is a strong 
indication that this theoretical criticism is not a valid concern 
in reality.
42
 
 
The one remaining common criticism of armed drone use 
in transnational armed conflicts is that their use outside of “hot 
battlefields” infringes upon the sovereignty of the nation in 
which the strike takes place.  The remainder of this essay 
addresses that concern.  
 
Where May Drones be Used? 
 
The use of armed drones clarifies larger legal issues 
concerning the boundaries of the battlefield in transnational 
armed conflicts such as the one between the US and al Qaeda.  
The reason why drones, rather than the other tools employed in 
the conflict with al Qaeda, such as special forces, regular army, 
FBI, or CIA, focus us in this way is because drones are 
exclusively tools of armed conflict. 
 
Armed drones may only legally be used in an armed 
conflict (as opposed to law enforcement), and the reason for 
this is that the dividing line between law enforcement and 
armed conflict is based upon when and how lethal force can be 
employed. 
 
Lethal force during a time of armed conflict can be 
applied against any positively identified enemy.  The positively 
identified enemy can be targeted whether they are dangerous or 
not, whether they are armed or not,  and whether they are awake 
or not.  The only restrictions against targeting a positively 
                                                 
42
 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Air Force Drone Operators Report High Levels of 
Stress, NY TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A8; see also Interview with P.W. Singer: The 
Soldiers Call it War Porn, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-defense-expert-p-w-singer-
the-soldiers-call-it-war-porn-a-682852.html (indicating that drone operators suffer 
from higher levels of combat stress and PTSD than do some units in the field). 
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identified enemy are if they are incapacitated or have 
surrendered.
43
 
 
In law enforcement, the only time lethal force can be 
employed is if the target is an imminent threat to law 
enforcement or others and an opportunity to surrender has been 
offered.  Because drones cannot offer an opportunity to 
surrender before employing lethal force they may not be used 
in a law enforcement environment and are may only be 
employed in times of armed conflict.   This means that when 
there are drone strikes in Yemen or in Pakistan, the  legal basis 
for them being used must be a belief that the laws of armed 
conflict apply rather than laws governing law enforcement.   
 
The argument that law enforcement rules, rather than the 
laws of armed conflict should apply outside of “hot 
battlefields” has been advanced by those who oppose strikes in 
places like Yemen and Pakistan.   These opponents contend that 
there is no war going on in Yemen, or at least that there was no 
war going on in Yemen a year and a half ago when the United 
States first began targeting Anwar Al-Awlaki in that nation.
44
  
Likewise they argue that there is no war going on in the FATA 
areas of Pakistan, and because of that the laws of armed 
conflict do not apply there, drone strikes are illegal in that area 
as well. 
 
This geographically minimalist  argument that seeks to 
strictly limit the boundaries of the battlefield in conflicts like 
the one between the U.S. and al Qaeda,  is based on the 
                                                 
43
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
August 2, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
44
 Note that al-Awlaki’s name is also transliterated al-Aulaqi, Complaint, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C 2010) (No. 10-01469) (the complaint filed 
in 2010 contended on 17 separate occasions in 11 pages that the targeting of al-Aulaqi 
was occurring “outside of armed conflict”); see also O’Connell testimony, note 3 supra 
(O’Connell maintains that there is no armed conflict in the border regions of Pakistan 
either). 
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description of the boundaries in the battlefield in non-
international armed conflicts.  There are two kinds of armed 
conflict, international armed conflicts (IAC’s) and non-
international conflicts (NIAC’s).45  International armed 
conflicts are easy to identify because they involve two 
countries, for example France versus Germany.  However, 
determining the boundaries of the battlefield in non-
international armed conflicts is more difficult because of the 
nature of the conflict and the fact that one of the participants is 
a non-state actor.  The Tadic opinion
46
 from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) dealt with that issue, 
when it determined the geography in which the laws armed 
conflict applied within the former Yugoslavia.  This opinion 
demonstrated an understandable hesitancy in applying the laws 
of armed conflict throughout an entire nation that is undergoing 
an internal conflict for the entire length of that conflict.  
Because the laws of armed conflict allow actions whose 
application should be limited, such as targeting based upon 
positive identification rather than dangerousness and indefinite 
detention without charge there is an obvious desire to limit the 
geography in which such rules apply.  Therefore the ICTY 
sought to curb the geographical and temporal scope of the laws 
of armed conflict in Tadic.   
 
The Tadic court applied the law of armed conflict  only 
in the geographic areas where there existed a threshold level of 
                                                 
45
 See Geneva I and Geneva 3, art. 3 (all four Geneva Conventions contain 
identical article 3’s, often termed “common article 3”.  Common article 3 describes the 
application of the Geneva Conventions to the two types of armed conflicts.  The 
difference between these two types of conflicts is more fully described by the 1977 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Compare Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I] (addressing international armed conflicts), with Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1987) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (addressing non-
international armed conflicts).   
  
46
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,¶¶ 561–62 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (“[A]n armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”). 
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violence and a level of cohesion in the actors fighting each 
other.  If this approach was applied to countries such as Yemen 
where (until recently) there was no armed conflict because the 
level of violence threshold was not met , then one would 
conclude that the tools of armed conflict could not be used 
there. 
 
The sensibilities that underlie this idea are not new and 
can be traced all the way back to our own civil war, which 
occurred long before any of these concepts were debated on an 
international level.  In ex Parte Milligan,
47
 a Southern 
sympathizer was captured in Indiana by Union forces.  He was 
tried by a military commission and sentenced to death.  He 
appealed on the grounds that he should have been afforded trial 
before an article 3 court rather than a military commission  and 
the United States Supreme Court agreed.  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that one may not try a Southern sympathizer before a 
military commission in Indiana if the civilian courts were open 
and available at the time.  In places where the institutions of 
civil society were still functioning, even though there was 
unquestionably a rebellion going on, those institutions of civil 
society must be used.  The result may have been quite different 
in Tennessee where the Union was acting as an occupying army 
and as such it was temporarily providing the institutions of 
civil society.  But in Indiana, the courts were open and so the 
laws of armed conflict should not be applied in that area 
because they need not be applied there. 
 
For internal NIAC’s this reasoning that underlay 
Milligan and Tadic makes perfect sense.  However, applying 
this reasoning to transnational armed conflicts is far more 
problematic.  The problem with using the Tadic factors to 
define the boundaries of the battlefield in such conflicts is that 
doing so essentially turns the Geneva Conventions on their 
head.   
 
                                                 
47
 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 4 (1866) (requiring that even during time of 
rebellion civilian courts be utilized instead of military commissions in geographical 
areas where the courts were functioning). 
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In order to understand why this happens, one has to have 
a basic understanding of the primary purpose of the Geneva 
Convention and how the Conventions look at the world.  
Geneva divides the world into two groups, combatants and 
civilians.
48
  Combatants are not just people that pick up guns, 
but rather people that belong to an organization that enforces 
the laws of war.  It is through the definition of combatancy that 
the laws of war encourage people to follow the laws of war.   
U.S. soldiers are combatants because they go to jail if they 
violate the laws of armed conflict  in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Because the United States enforces the laws of war, its soldiers 
are combatants. 
 
The advantage of being a combatant is that they are 
entitled to the combatant’s privilege, which  means that 
combatants are not legally liable for the harm and destruction 
they cause as long as they complied with the laws of war. For 
example, if a combatant blows up a building and hurts the 
people in the building, he cannot be charged with assault, 
arson, murder, etc. if the attack was conducted in keeping with 
the laws of war.  The disadvantage of being a combatant is that 
they are targetable 24/7 because of their status as an identified 
enemy.  
 
Everyone that is not a combatant is a civilian.
49
  The 
advantage of being a civilian is that they are never 
targetable under any circumstances.  The disadvantage is 
that civilians are not allowed to participate in armed 
conflict and if they do so they forfeit the immunity that 
                                                 
48
 It should be noted that the ICRC document does not have the force of law and 
can only become customary international law if its parameters are accepted by a 
number of states.  Because military reaction to the Interpretive Guidance has contended 
that the definitions offered are too narrow (i.e., that the ICRC considers that fewer 
people and fewer actions constitute direct participation in hostilities than the military 
might), the Interpretive Guidance should be viewed as a baseline description of 
behavior that inarguably constitutes direct participation in hostilities while the actual 
state of the law remains less clear.  See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally 
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010) (criticizing the ICRC’s approach to 
direct participation in hostilities in Part IX of the Interpretive Guidance). 
49
 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE at 997. 
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comes with being a civilian.   When a civilian picks up a 
gun and starts firing, they lose their immunity.  They can 
regain their immunity by putting their gun down and 
ceasing to participate in hostilities .  Some civilians that 
continue in the revolving door between fighter by night 
and farmer by day, or actively perform leadership roles 
are termed continuous combat functionaries and they 
become targetable 24/7 just as though they were a 
combatant.  This permanent loss of civilian immunity is 
based upon the function that the civilian performs within 
an armed group.    
 
In this way IHL provides that if someone is functioning 
like a combatant, then they may be targeted like a combatant.
50
  
However, even if they may be targeted like a combatant they 
are not entitled to the combatant’s privilege, because they are 
still considered to be civilians directly participating in 
hostilities.  They do not belong to an organization that enforces 
the laws of war, therefore they cannot be combatants .  This is 
how IHL deals with groups such as al Qaeda.  It denies them 
the combatant’s privilege,  but it permits the continuous 
targeting of active members of such groups that perform 
combatant functions.  The only way someone in a group like al 
Qaeda can regain their civilian immunity is to get away from al 
Qaeda and definitively disassociate themselves from the group.  
 
The problem with using the Tadic factors to determine 
the geographical scope of a transnational armed conflict is that 
it gives al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations another way 
to effectively regain their civilian immunity.  By simply 
crossing the border into Pakistan, or going to Yemen, or to 
Somalia, or Sudan, places where law enforcement is not 
effective, and where the threshold of violence required by 
Tadic is not present an al Qaeda member could effectively 
regain their civilian immunity.  This is because the 
geographical minimalist view that applies the Tadic factors 
would consider the lack of local violence to mean that the laws 
                                                 
  
50
 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE at 993-96, 1031-33. 
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of armed conflict would not apply in those areas and the tools 
of law enforcement would be the exclusive method by which 
these terrorists could be pursued.  The idea that IHL should be 
interpreted in this manner, resulting in one of IHL’s least 
favored groups (terrorists that target civilians and hide amongst 
the civilian population) being afforded this kind of sanctuary 
seems contrary to the core principles of IHL. 
 
The alternative to applying Tadic to transnational armed 
conflicts is to apply the neutrality law principles that have 
determined the boundaries of the battlefield in IAC’s for 
centuries, and it appears that this is what the US is doing.  
While the US position is far from definitive about its legal 
rationale for employing drones, it is possible to cobble together 
the speeches of various administration officials from the past 
couple of years (Koh at ASIL a couple of years ago, Brennan at 
Harvard last September and Holder at Northwestern in April)
51
 
and get a feel for how the administration views this issue.  
What they appear to be doing and the norm I believe they are 
effectively creating is that the boundaries of the battlefield in 
transnational armed conflicts will be determined by a modified 
version of centuries-old neutrality law.  
 
The law of neutrality has been used to determine the 
boundaries of the battlefield and the rights and obligations of 
nations involved in IAC’s for over a century.52  During a 
conflict between state A and state B where some of A’s forces 
take refuge in or use a neutral state as a base of operations that 
neutral state has an obligation to remove A’s forces from its 
territory.  When state B demands that this removal take place, 
the neutral state has three choices in response.  It can become 
an ally of B and allow B’s forces onto its territory to go after 
A’s forces, it can become an enemy of B by preventing B’s 
forces from entering its territory and harboring A’s forces, or it 
can remain neutral by denying B’s forces the right to enter 
while expelling A’s forces from its territory.  
                                                 
51
 Speeches on file with law review. 
52
 See Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land arts. 1–5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter 
Hague V] (establishing the inviolate nature of neutral territory for belligerents). 
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The conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda has 
displayed all three of these choices in its application of 
neutrality law principles to a transnational armed conflict .  The 
first example occurred when the United States approached 
Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and demanded the 
expulsion of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and others.  
Afghanistan acted as an enemy of the U.S. by refusing to 
discharge its neutral obligations and harboring bin Laden and 
other al Qaeda members within its borders.  As a result, when 
the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to pursue al Qaeda it also 
attacked the Taliban because they effectively became the 
enemy by harboring al Qaeda.  The second example is that of 
Yemen when the U.S. approached it over al Qaeda’s presence 
within its borders.  Yemen chose to act as an ally of the United 
States, and (as WikiLeaks has made clear) granted permission 
for the U.S. to use armed force on its territory.  With this 
permission the U.S. has conducted numerous drone strikes on 
Yemeni territory since 2002, including the one that killed 
Anwar al-Awlaki last September.  The third example is when 
states retain their neutral status by denying the U.S. permission 
to employ armed force on their territory while discharging their 
neutral obligations by expelling or arresting al Qaeda members 
within their borders.  Numerous European states have taken 
this approach by either detaining suspected al Qaeda members 
themselves or allowing U.S. law enforcement to apprehend al 
Qaeda members on their territory.    
 
The most widely analyzed event in the conflict with al 
Qaeda of the past few years (the killing of Osama bin Laden by 
U.S. Special Forces in Pakistan) also fits within this 
framework.  Pakistan had clearly acted as an ally of the U.S. on 
a number of occasions by giving the U.S. permission to use 
force on its territory, either in the form of drone strikes or 
special forces missions.  However, there were also ways that 
Pakistan had acted as an enemy toward the U.S. by failing to 
make any effort to detain or expel al Qaeda members from its 
territory.  The fact that bin Laden had lived undisturbed within 
a few miles of Pakistan’s military academy was viewed as 
evidence that Pakistan was either unable or unwilling to 
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apprehend or expel bin Laden.  The U.S. viewed this failure by 
Pakistan to discharge its neutral obligations as the basis for 
using armed force on Pakistani territory without Pakistani 
permission.      
 
In conclusion, the state practice of the United States in 
the conflict with al Qaeda appears to rely on the application of 
neutrality law principles in determining the boundaries of the 
battlefield.  This is borne out by the way in which the U.S. has 
employed armed drones, which are exclusively tools of armed 
conflict, in areas outside of “hot battlefields”.  When compared 
with the competing vision of the boundaries of the battlefield 
offered by the “geographic minimalists”  that applies the Tadic 
factors to transnational armed conflicts, it becomes clear that 
relying upon neutrality law principles for determining the 
scope of transnational armed conflicts is more in keeping with 
the core principles of IHL.       
 
 
 
